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Abstract—RFID systems allow the fast and automatic identi-
fication of items through a wireless channel. Items’ information
like name, model, purpose, and expiration date can be easily
stored and retrieved from RFID tags attached to items. Conse-
quently, in the near future, RFID tags might be an active part
of our every-day life when interacting with items around us.
However, important security and privacy concerns arise from
the wireless nature of this technology because tags are resource-
constrained devices that respond to any reader interrogation. Al-
though these concerns have been successfully faced by symmetric
cryptography schemes, managing a large number of tags is still
cumbersome. Therefore, application-dependant solutions seem to
be better for the secure, private and efficient identification of tags.
In this paper, we propose a new scheme for the fast identification
of tags based on readers strategically distributed throughout the
system. Using the spatial location of tags, our scheme is able to
expedite the identification of tags regardless of the identification
protocol used. Furthermore, differently to previous proposals,
our scheme is flexible and adaptable to any scenario and to any
movement’s pattern of tags.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless tech-
nology aimed at identifying items automatically. Similar to
barcodes systems, each item is tagged with one or more
tags containing the item identifier. Then, the RFID reader
is able to extract the RFID tag’s data wirelessly and sends
them to a server in order to identify the item. The wireless
nature of RFID systems removes the need for a line-of-sight
contact between tags and readers and therefore, improves
the efficiency in several applications such as supply chain
management, inventory control, etc.
An RFID tag can be classified according to its power source
in active or passive. Active tags come with an on-board battery
that provides the required energy for larger reading ranges
and higher computational resource consumption. On the other
hand, passive RFID tags are less powerful devices that do not
require on-board battery because they use the reader signal
interrogation strength as their energy source. Whether to use
an active tag or a passive one depends on the application and
the company budget, both offer pros and cons in terms of price,
lifespan time, reading distance and computational power.
During the deployment of an RFID system, all these features
should be considered together with other major concerns such
as security, privacy and scalability. By default, security and
privacy are desired features for identification systems, whilst
scalability is required just in those applications that should
manage a large number of tags. Since RFID tags are resource-
constrained devices with limited computational capabilities
that respond to any reader interrogation through an insecure
channel, ensuring security and privacy in RFID systems are
challenging tasks. So far, symmetric key cryptography without
key sharing seems to be the most suitable solution for the
private and secure identification of RFID tags. However, this
approach usually draws a scalability problem for the server.
Assume that, looking for private identification, a tag encrypts
its identifier using its secret key and sends this encrypted
message to the server. Then, in order to determine the tag’s
identity the server needs to decrypt the message using the tag’s
key but, direct retrieval of the tag’s key is only possible when
the server knows the tag’s identity. Consequently, the server
should perform an exhaustive search looking for the proper
key to decrypt the message thus, causing scalability problems.
The balance between privacy and scalability in RFID sys-
tems has been extensively studied [1]. Solutions based on
key updating [2] or key sharing [3], [4], [5] are shown to
be vulnerable against active attacks [6], [7], whilst private
solutions based on pseudonyms or symmetric key cryptog-
raphy [8], [9] are poorly scalable. As a result, application-
dependant solutions taking advantage of the intrinsic properties
and features of the application, seem to be the most suitable
for achieving privacy and scalability at the same time.
Let us consider an RFID system intended for identification
and tracking, e.g. tracking of goods inside a supply chain
or luggage control inside an airport. In such applications,
several RFID readers are distributed over the system in order to
identify tags passing through the RFID readers positions [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. Doing so, it is possible to obtain
the trajectory of a tag by concatenating the reader’s positions
where the tag has been identified. Even in applications without
tracking purposes, it makes sense to distribute a set of readers
covering strategic points or the whole monitored area [10] in
order to identify the tags moving into it. Supermarkets with
several output/input doors or department stores are genuine
examples of such applications.
Although there are several applications where many tags
should be identified using some readers, to the best of our
knowledge, just two protocols exploiting this particular prop-
erty have been proposed so far [10] and [11]. Furthermore,
none of them fully describes how to optimize the identification
process in different scenarios. Whilst the protocol in [10] is
restricted to be applied in just a few scenarios like open areas,
the protocol in [11] still does not scale well enough.
We indicate that the scalability problems of some pri-
vate protocols can be alleviated not only distributing readers
throughout the system, but also by exploiting the spatial
location of tags. Indeed, a tagged item usually follows a
pre-established life-cycle and then, it could be intelligently
identified according to its expected spatial location. In this
paper, we propose an adaptive and distributed architecture
aimed at efficiently identifying RFID tags based on their
expected spatial location. Unlike previous proposals [10],
our architecture is suitable for all possible scenarios and
adapts itself according to the type of tags’ movement. We
show empirical results based on synthetic data confirming the
superiority of our architecture with respect to the previous
proposals [10] and [11].
A. Related Work
Distributed databases have been extensively used for search
engines, query systems and inference systems. In this archi-
tecture, data can be located according to their demand or
characteristics, and the database systems could be parallelized,
allowing load on the databases to be balanced amongst servers.
Since an RFID system can also generate a large amount of
information that may need to be processed as a whole, dis-
tributed databases are not an option, but a need for large-scale
systems. Some distributed architectures have been proposed
for RFID systems [12], [13], [14], [15], but none is designed
for the fast identification of tags. Indeed, their concern is
how to handle the information coming from a tag after its
identification and not the identification itself.
From the scalability point of view, defined as the number
of cryptographic operations performed in order to identify
a tag, it is not relevant whether a distributed database is
composed by several interconnected computers, or it is a
computer with several processors, or the database is just a
computer that logically distributes the tags’ information. What
is really important is to guarantee the consistency and syn-
chronization amongst the different databases. In consequence,
protocols based on key updating, in general, are not suitable
for a distributed architecture. Exceptions are the group-based
protocols [2], [4] where each tag belongs to a fixed group and
a tag responds not only with its encrypted identifier, but also
with the encrypted identifier of the group to which it belongs.
Then, after the group identification, the server performs an
exhaustive search in the space of identifiers of the identified
group, reducing the number of operations in the server side.
Note that in these cases, updating the tag’s key [2] is not
a problem for the distributed architecture because each tag
is always authenticated using the same database and hence,
synchronization between both parties can be easily achieved.
Nevertheless, as tags are not tamper-resistant, compromising
one tag leads to the disclosure of a shared key used by other
tags during the identification process. Thus, in this type of
protocols, scalability is achieved by sacrifying privacy. On
the contrary, privacy-friendly protocols based on symmetric
cryptography [8], [9], and perfectly suitable for distributed
architecture, do not scale well.
To the best of our knowledge, Solanas et al. [10] proposed
the first protocol that efficiently uses the spatial locations
of tags in a distributed architecture. In this proposal, RFID
readers collaborate in order to indentify a tag into the system.
To do so, each reader in the system covers a specific squared
area, called cell, and the whole monitored area should be
covered with these cells guaranteeing that every tag into
the system is continuously monitored by at least one reader.
In this system, two readers are said to be neighbours if
there exits a continuous line between both cells no passing
through another cell. The identification process is considerably
improved due to the neighbourhood relationships of readers
and the fact that a tag always moves through neighbour cells.
Although this proposal improves the system’s scalability it
cannot deal with scenarios that cannot be or do not need
to be completely covered by a set of readers. Furthermore,
technological challenges arise in the implementation of this
proposal because readers must compute the distance to a tag
in order to be sure that a tag is in their cells.
Similarly, Fouladgar and Afifi [11] point out that tags
are usually queried by the same readers. For instance, tags
belonging to people living in the same district will be read, in
general, by the readers placed in this district (doors’ readers,
bus’ readers, etc). Therefore, unlike the group-based proposals
[2], [4], they propose to cluster tags according to the readers
that use them more often. In this way, when a tag responds to a
reader R, the reader sends this response to a ”Dispatcher” that
requests to the database corresponding to R the identification
of the tag. If the R’s database correctly identifies the tag,
depending on the R’s rights, the ”Dispatcher” decides whether
to give the tag’s information to R. Otherwise, the ”Dispatcher”
tries to identify the tag using the database of another reader.
The efficiency of this protocol relies on two assumptions: i) It
is possible to cluster tags according to their expected spatial
locations, and ii) tags are, in general, read by the same subset
of readers. However, a tag can have a long life-cycle in which
it could be moving through different scenarios. In such case,
as the subset of readers assigned to a tag are defined a priori
and not dynamically tuned up, this proposal could scale as
bad as previous protocols based on symmetric cryptography
[8], [9].
II. OUR PROPOSAL
As stated in [11], in practice, a reader R probably will
identify a tag T several times. In this case, the server overhead
can be easily reduced storing T ’s keys in R’s cache [10]. The
reader cache is defined as a storage device where a reader saves
data concerning only to it. It can be either an external database
securely connected to the reader or a database internally
managed by the reader.
If R’s cache is small in comparison to the total number
of tags into the system, identifying a tag by using R’s cache
can be considered efficient. For instance, let us assume that
tags are static devices and each reader saves in its cache
just the keys of the tags inside its reading range. If tags
are uniformly distributed, the computational complexity of
identifying a tag is O(n
k
) where n and k are the number
of tags and readers in the system. Note that, as the number
of readers grows, more efficient the identification process is.
However, in practice, neither tags are static devices nor they
are distributed uniformly. Therefore, strategies considering the
expected spatial locations of tags during their life-cycle should
be considered in order to manage readers’ cache.
Unlike mobile systems, RFID systems use short communi-
cation distances. Thus, after the identification of a tag T by
a reader R, T ’s spatial location can be estimated with a high
level of confidence using R’s spatial location. By doing so,
tags’ trajectories can be recorded during their lifespan using
several readers in the system. The more readers are scattered
in the system, the better the accuracy of the tags’ trajectories.
Definition 1 (Trajectory of a tag): Let R and T be the set
of readers and tags deployed into the system respectively. The
trajectory of a tag T ∈ T is defined as the sequence of readers
ST = {RT1 , R
T
2 , · · · } such that, for every i > 0, RTi ∈ R and,
tT1 ≤ t
T
2 ≤ · · · where tTi is the time in which the reader RTi
identified T .
Assuming that tags’ trajectories are known before the releas-
ing of the tags into the system, i.e. assuming that tags move
according to some patterns then, fast identification of tags is
possible by inferring helpful knowledge from these patterns.
We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1 (Only one tag in the system): Let us consider now
the case where T = {T } and T ’s trajectory ST =
{RT1 , R
T
2 , · · · } is known before the releasing of T into the
system. Then, if RTi is trying to identify T , it is because
RTi−1 already identified T previously. Therefore, during the
identification of T , RTi just needs to ask for help to RTi−1,
which probably knows how to identify T . Note that, after
the identification, RTi should save T ’s required data in order
to identify T without the help of RTi−1 in the future. Using
this algorithm, the location of T is always known and, it is
possible to efficiently identify it. Unfortunately, this algorithm
is useless because a system controlling a single tag does not
have scalability problems.
Case 2 (Several tags in the system): Let us consider the
case where several tags T = {T1, T2, · · · } are moving into the
system and, Ti’s trajectory STi = {RTi1 , RTi2 , · · · } is known,
for every i, before the releasing of Ti into the system. When
a reader R ∈ R receives the response of a tag T ∈ T , it
cannot use T ’s trajectory to improve the identification process
because T ’s identity is unknown to R. However, R can use
helpful knowledge inferred from the tags’ trajectories in order
to know which readers have higher probabilities of identify it.
Proposition 1: Let c(Ri, Rj) = |{< k, l > s.t. Ri =
RTlk and Rj = R
Tl
k+1}| be the number of times that readers
Ri and Rj appear consecutively in the set of tags’ trajectories
and, let p(Ri, Rj) be the probability that Ri and Rj appear
consecutively in the trajectory of an unknown tag:
p(Ri, Rj) =
c(Ri, Rj)∑
∀k,k 6=j c(Rk, Rj)
When R is trying to identify T , differently to the Case
1, it is not sure about which reader previously identified T .
However, using Proposition 1 and the set of tags’ trajectories,
it is possible to find the reader that most likely identified T
previously. By doing so, R might find quickly a reader that can
identify T . The problem in this solution is that Proposition 1
can only be used when the set of tags’ trajectories is known
a priori and, in practice, this is generally not possible.
Case 3 (No movements’ patterns of tags): In this case,
tags have no movements’ patterns. This means that, a priori,
it is not possible to know the trajectory followed by a tag
during its life-cycle and hence, Proposition 1 is useless for the
identification process. For this case, we propose a heuristic
algorithm that computes an estimated value of p(Ri, Rj)
when needed for any pair of readers Ri and Rj . Using
this algorithm and a distributed architecture, we propose a
new scheme that efficiently identifies tags according to their
expected spatial locations.
A. Protocol Initialization
Our distributed architecture is defined as a weighted, di-
rected, and completed graph G =< R, E > where R =
{R1, · · · , Rn} is the set of readers and, E is the set of
secure connections amongst the different readers. Initially,
all tags’ data are distributed amongst the readers’ caches.
This distribution can be done in different ways: i) storing
all tags’ data in just one reader’s cache, ii) storing each
tag’s data in a reader’s cache randomly chosen, iii) storing
each tag’s data in the reader’s cache corresponding to the
reader that should read the tag more often, etc. Actually,
this distribution can be done randomly because our protocol
balances readers’ caches according to the spatial location of
tags. Like in an optimization problems, the initial distribution
only has influence on how fast the optimal distribution can be
found by our protocol. The only constraint of the proposed
algorithm is that each tag’s data must appear in, at least, one
reader’s cache.
The weights associated to each connection in G can be also
assigned in different ways: i) assigning equal values to all of
them, ii) assigning random values to each one, iii) assigning
values according to the experience of the systems administrator
or iv) assigning to each edge (Ri → Rj) the value p(Ri, Rj)
(see Proposition 1). Although the latter option is preferred, this
is only possible when the set of tags’ trajectories is known.
In any case, these values will be dynamically tune up during
the system life-cycle according to the movements’ patterns of
tags.
Remark 1: For the sake of simplicity, we denote the edge’s
weight between readers Ri and Rj as p(Ri, Rj) instead of
using the classical notation w(Ri, Rj).
B. Protocol Execution
When a reader Ri receives an encrypted identification
message from a tag T , Ri tries to identify T using its own
cache. If this first identification attempt fails, Ri creates a
list L of readers such that: Ri /∈ L and, for every pair
of readers R and R′ in L, R is sorted in L before R′ if
p(R, Ri) > p(R
′, Ri), i.e. in descending order. Then, for
each reader R ∈ L, Ri sends the T ’s encrypted identification
message to R in order to identify T using R’s cache. Upon
a correct identification of T by a reader R, Ri saves in its
cache the information required to identify T and, at the same
time, R removes T from its cache. If none of the readers could
identify T , it is because T is an invalid tag. More details about
our protocol execution can be found in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Tag identification
Require: R = {R1, · · · , Rn} a set of readers and a tag T to
be identify by the reader Ri ∈ R.
1: Let c : R×R → Integer be a matrix initialized with non
zero values. The matrix c represents the function used in
Proposition 1.
2: if T is correctly identified by reader Ri then
3: return The identification process finishes correctly.
4: end if
5: Let L = {R1i , R2i , · · · , R
n−1
i } be a permutation of R
such as Ri /∈ L and p(R1i , Ri) ≥ p(R2i , Ri) ≥ · · · ≥
p(Rn−1i , Ri).
6: for j = 1 to n− 1 do
7: if T is correctly identified by reader Rji then
8: T is removed from Rji ’s cache and inserted into Ri’s
cache.
9: c(Rji , Ri)← c(R
j
i , Ri) + 1.
10: p(Rji , Ri) =
c(Rj
i
,Ri)∑
∀k
c(Rk
i
,Ri)
.
11: return The identification process finishes correctly.
12: end if
13: end for
14: return T could not be identified using any of the readers
distributed along the system.
It should be noticed that our protocol does not have neither
false positive nor false negative identifications. In the worst
case, a tag should be identified using all readers’ cache, in
which case, like in previous proposals [8], [9], our perfor-
mance is O(|T |).
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In practice, testing RFID protocols with real data sets of tags
movements is complicated, especially because data sets having
a significant number of tags movements are hard to obtain.
With the aim to overcome this limitation, we define two types
of tags’ movements and three different scenarios in order to
evaluate and compare our protocol with other proposals [10],
[11].
Fig. 1: Open area completely covered by 96 readers .
A. Scenarios
The first scenario is an open area (see Figure 1) where tags
can freely move. The area is completely covered by 96 readers
uniformly distributed over the whole area. By doing so, we
meet the constraints of the Solanas et. al. protocol w.r.t. the
readers distribution [10] and hence, comparisons between all
the proposals are possible.
The second and third scenarios are representations of the
seven Bridges of Ko¨nigsberg1. In these scenarios, people’s
movements are constrained by the river and thus, they can
only use bridges in order to move to different sides of the
city. Like people, we assume that tags should not be on
the river and then, we design the second and third scenarios
using two different readers’ distribution. The second scenario
(see Figure 2), is a representation of the Ko¨nigsberg city
where 14 readers cover the entire city. This scenario meets
the constraints of the Solanas et. al. protocol w.r.t. the reader
distribution [10]. Since covering a city by 14 RFID readers can
be not practical, we design a third scenario (see Figure 3) that
only differs from the previous one in the reading ranges and
positions of the readers. Notice that, in the second scenario a
tag can be monitored in every part of the city, while in the
third scenario a tag can only be read when passing through
a bridge. However, due to the movements’ constraints in the
city and the strategic position of the readers, it is easy to know
in which side of the city each tag is located. This is a good
example of how intelligently placing readers is possible to
obtain accurate tags’ trajectories.
B. Tags’ Movements
Initially, a tag is located in a valid and random position of
the scenario. Later, the tag moves according to two types of
1The Seven bridges of Ko¨nigsberg is a notable historical problem in
mathematics. In 1735, Leonhard Euler proved that no Eulerian path exists
for the Ko¨nigsberg city. This result set the foundations of graph theory.
Fig. 2: Ko¨nigsberg city representation where 14 readers cover
the entire city. Black blocks represent the river water and, the
seven bridges are represented by the square spaces between
black blocks.
Fig. 3: Ko¨nigsberg city representation where 14 readers are
monitoring the input and output of the bridges. Black blocks
represent the river water and, the seven bridges are represented
by the square spaces between black blocks.
movement:
• Random movement: at each step, a tag chooses a
random direction and moves on this direction.
• Semi-directed movement: In this movement, a tag al-
ways has a target point. Once the tag arrives to its target,
it changes the target point to a new random and valid
point in the scenario. Then, at each step, with probability
0.5 the tag chooses whether to move randomly or to move
on the target’s direction.
Between both movements, semi-directed movement can be
considered closer to real movement patterns of people. How-
ever, unpredictable movement’s patterns can be only evaluated
using a random movement.
C. Simulations
In order to compare our protocol against the two previous
proposals [10], [11], we perform simulations on the three
scenarios defined above. For each scenario, different settings
defined by the number of tags into the system and the type of
movement are used. A simulation process consists of 104 tags
moving according to some pattern (random or semi-directed)
in one of the three scenario. For each simulation process, tags
are identified using four different methods:
1) The Fouladgar et. al. method [11] assuming that each
tag is in the cache of only one reader. We refer to this
method as Fouladgar one-to-one.
2) The Fouladgar et. al. method [11] assuming that each
tag can be in the cache of several readers. In [11], the
authors propose to store the tag’s data in the cache of
those readers that may read it more often. As this is not
possible for the two movement patterns defined above,
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Fig. 4: Percentage of improvement of our proposal w.r.t.
previous ones considering the random movement and 104 tags.
we make a reasonable assumption: a tag will be in the
cache of the readers that have identified it previously.
We refer to this method as Fouladgar one-to-many.
3) The Solanas et. al. method [10] named as Solanas. Due
to the constraints of this method, it can only be used
within the first two scenarios.
4) The method proposed in this article.
In order to give statistically sound results, each simulation
process is executed 30 times computing the average number of
cryptographic operations performed by each method. Figure 4
and Figure 5 show the experimental results obtained for 104
tags moving according to the random movement and the semi-
directed movement respectively. In both figures, it can be
observed that our proposal improves the previous ones in more
than 50%. This means that, for any scenario and any type of
movement, our proposal executes, in the worst case, the half of
the number of cryptographic operations executed by previous
proposals.
Our proposal performs better than previous ones mainly due
to three reasons: i) after the identification of a tag, the reader
saves in its own cache the tag’s data in order to identify it faster
in the future, ii) the size of readers’ caches are minimized in
such a way that two readers never share tags’ information and,
iii) when a reader cannot identify a tag using its own cache, it
is able to heuristically find another reader that could identify
this tag. This heuristic is one of our main contributions because
for the first time tags can be identified according to their type
of movement.
In order to check how useful this heuristic is, we perform
simulations aimed at comparing our proposal with or without
this heuristic. The settings used during the simulations are the
same that those defined for the previous simulations. Figure 6
shows, for each scenario and each type of movement, the
percentage of improvement of our proposal using our heuristic
w.r.t. our proposal without using it. It should be noticed that,
the proposed heuristic improves our architecture in all cases.
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Also, it can be seen in Figure 6 that the heuristic works better
when movement’s patterns exist (Random vs Semi-directed).
This is particularly relevant because, in general, tags move
according to some pattern, e.g. the luggage in an airport or
the buyers in a shop.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper we proposed a new distributed architecture
for RFID systems that considerable improves the identifica-
tion process of tags. Like previous proposals [10], [11], our
architecture is based on readers strategically distributed over
the monitored area. However, contrary to those proposals,
our architecture uses a heuristic that predicts the expected
spatial location of tags. By doing so, readers can intelligently
collaborate in order to identify tags. Also, our architecture is
flexible enough to be applied to any scenario where several
readers can be deployed. The experimental results show that
our proposal clearly outperforms previous ones [10], [11]
in terms of scalability. In the worst case, our proposal is
better in more than 50%. As future work, we propose to
develop heuristics considering the space-time in the set of tags’
trajectories. Note that, movement’s patterns of tags might be
different in time, e.g. during the day or the night, during the
working days or the weekend, etc. Consequently, experiments
using real data-set of tags’ trajectories must be considered in
order to capture the variation of the movement’s patterns of
tags.
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